The Paper Shields: Which of America’s Allies Will Be Allies In Name Only Next Decade?
What good is an ally if they cause more trouble than they are worth? Looking around the globe, American policymakers have had ample cause to ask themselves that about a number of this country’s nominal allies. On paper, no country has withdrawn from an alliance or defense treaty with the United States in 2019, whether its most significant one (NATO) or any of its others that span the breadth of the planet. However, over the past year and before, several of America’s relationships with its allies became highly problematic, even as their treaty commitments remain untouched. This poses an unprecedented security challenge to America as it hopes to maintain its primacy in global affairs in the face of rising rival powers Russia and China.
The highest profile case of this would be Turkey, but similar issues have arisen in South Korea, Thailand and elsewhere. The root causes of these new divides between the U.S. and these countries go back for years or even decades, but they certainly have been exacerbated by the incompetence of the Trump administration. When 2020 draws to a close, the country will hopefully be waiting on the imminent inauguration of a new Presidential administration with a different approach to foreign policy. However, said new administration will likely find restoring relations with these countries to the old status quo more difficult than they might think.
In October, I wrote about the current state of relations between the United States and Turkey, and how they have increasingly soured over, among other things, the question of American support for the Kurdish fighters in Syria. The situation between the two countries has only worsened in the two months since I wrote that article. Two weeks ago, the U.S. Senate went ahead with what it had been threatening to do for months, passing sanctions on Turkey for both its military action in Syria as well as its purchase of Russian-made S-400 missiles. Undeterred, Turkey expressed resolve to move ahead with the installation of S-400 missiles regardless. And hints of greater retaliation were yet to come.
The United States maintains hundreds of military bases in countries around the world, but few are as important to its global security strategy than Incirlik. Located in southeastern Turkey, the Air Force base houses fifty B61 nuclear bombs, one of the largest stockpiles of those weapons outside of American soil. The base’s geographic position also makes it a prime takeoff point for flight missions throughout the Middle East, with U.S. planes using it extensively during both Iraq Wars, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the 2014 air campaign against ISIS. In the event of an outright hostile situation between the United States and Turkey, those weapons could turn into the world’s most dangerous hostages.
The 2016 coup d’etat attempt against Erdogan by elements within the Turkish military offered a partial preview of what an Incirlik standoff might look like. Erdogan believed that General Bacir Ercan Van, commander of the base’s Turkish section, to be involved in the coup and ordered his arrest. In order to ensure that the U.S. would not interfere (Van requested asylum but was denied), the Turks cut off all external power to the American sections of the base. Although there was no further escalation, the precedent had been set for further Turkish action.
As the U.S. imposed its December sanctions against Turkey, the question of Incirlik was raised yet again. In a televised interview, Erdogan made explicit the threat that, even during the 2016 coup, had gone unsaid. He stated outright that, if necessary, Turkey would close down Incirlik. For a Turkish President to say this in public would have been unthinkable even four years ago.
Further saber rattling has already taken place between the U.S. and Turkey, and many observers already treat Turkey’s exit from NATO as a fait accompli. The only question, in their minds, is whether Turkey will leave NATO of its own accord or whether or not the alliance will expel them first. I tend to be skeptical of this view. The U.S. leaving the alliance would only drive Turkey even further into the arms of Russia and China, while Turkey retains much more leverage to block western actions against it as a member of NATO than it would have outside of the alliance. For example, Turkey has used its NATO member vote to hold up a new defense plan for the Baltic states, hoping to leverage recognition of the Kurdish YPG as a terrorist organization. Expect actions like this to become more and more commonplace in the new decade.
Furthermore, this trajectory would likely continue even in the event of President Erdogan dropping dead of a heart attack tomorrow. The journal Texas National Security Review hosted an in-depth roundtable discussion of several Turkey experts, where the “the widespread (and by no means Justice and Development Party[Erdogan’s party]-specific) anti-Americanism” was discussed as a key factor underscoring Erdogan (a loyal U.S. ally for the first decade of his administration) turning against the West.
Most surprising to me in the roundtable was a comment by Stockholm University academic Paul Levin about the influence within the Turkish military of followers of Dogu Perincek. Perincek is the founder and leader of the Patriotic Party, a political movement that subscribes to Eurasianism, a particular brand of either far-left or far-right (depending on who you ask). My understanding of the Turkish Eurasianists is that their influence in Turkish politics was fringe and minimal- the party barely boasted more than twenty thousand members as of 2015. In fact, as recently as 2014, Perincek was serving a life sentence for alleged plots to undermine the Turkish state.
However, he was released in March of that year, Levin notes that since then, “Eurasianists have secured greater influence within the military… following the July 15, 2016, coup attempt.” In the past, the Turkish permanent military establishment or “deep state” (the term itself was coined in Turkey) was a vehicle for keeping Turkey in the pro-Western camp, particularly during the Cold War- some of the coups of that era removed Prime Ministers who were too soft on Communism. But if the alignment of the Turkish deep state has become reversed, than that means that even if a pro-Western leader were somehow to replace Erdogan, they would likely face implacable opposition from not only much of the public as described above, but from much of the military establishment as well. Such a combination would be nigh impossible to resist barring a major shift in social attitudes from the ground up.
Thousands of miles away, but still on the continent of Asia, a similar situation is developing between the United States and one of its traditional allies. Military and political ties between the two nations date back to 1954, when Thailand signed onto the Manila Pact. That treaty established SEATO, which as its name suggests was intended to be the equivalent of NATO in Southeast Asia, providing a bulwark against communism in that region much as NATO did in Europe. That alliance lacked NATO’s longevity, however- with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent fall of Saigon it became a dead letter, and it was formally abolished in 1977.
Often overlooked by American historians in favor of focusing on Vietnam, Thailand waged its own struggle against a Communist insurgency that lasted from 1965 to 1983. In its struggle against the Maoist Thai Communist Party, the United States provided military support and advisers. However, as China moved away from Maoism and embraced a more open economic (if not political) model, relations with China began to improve. With China no longer backing the Communist insurgency, Thailand saw them as a bulwark against potential expansion from the newly Communist (but staunchly anti-Chinese) Vietnam, which threatened its northeastern border. Despite this, Thailand has continued to collaborate with the United States extensively, with Brian Harding of CSIS (a major American national security think tank) writing that “the depth and breadth of existing U.S.-Thai cooperation is remarkable.”
However, in that same article, Harding highlighted several recent issues that have come to pose problems for the U.S.-Thai alliance. He points out that among “many Southeast Asian nations eager for U.S. presence to to counterbalance rising Chinese influence, Thailand stands out as being comfortable with China’s rise and its intentions despite being one of the United States’ two treaty allies in Southeast Asia.” It is an ironic twist of history that monarchist Thailand has far better relations with China than China’s fellow Communist state Vietnam, which has increased defense ties with Washington over the past several years. Thailand has been going in the opposite direction.
In 2018 the Chinese and Thais took a heretofore unprecedented step in developing their relationship. China has long coveted an alternate shipping route for its oil imports from the Middle East, reducing its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Malacca has had historic problems with piracy, and in the event of a U.S. China conflict, would be vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy. This is where Thailand’s major strategic significance to Beijing reveals itself.
In 2018, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha announced that the country’s planning and security agencies would study the feasibility of a canal across the country’s Isthmus of Kra. China had for years envisioned this canal as a prime alternative to Malacca, and as a key node of its Belt and Road Initiative. Although the project has not yet come to fruition as of the end of 2019, that step in the process was unprecedented, and it could change the balance of power in Southeast Asia.
As has become typical in many places in the world, Trump’s actions have contributed to the deterioration in U.S.-China relations. In this case, the issue is his belief that U.S. allies give the country “bad deals” on trade, and Thailand has been no exception. In October, the Trump administration revoked Thailand’s duty-free treatment on over $1 billion worth of American goods, ostensibly over Thailand’s “failure to adequately protect worker’s rights, including in the crucial fishery industry.” The raging hypocrisy of this coming from perhaps the most anti-labor U.S. administration in nearly a century truly boggles the mind.
For its part, Thailand has retaliated in ways both direct and indirect. One of these indirect ways was applied not to the U.S. directly, but rather to one of its most important allies in Asia, Taiwan. Thailand has begun to increase red tape for Taiwanese tourists and businessmen hoping to travel to the country, scrapping preferential visa treatment for these. Previously, Taiwanese travel to the country had been steadily increasing, as part of a “pivot to Southeast Asia” policy announced by its President Tsai Ing-Wen. This policy is pivotal to Taiwan (and by extent the United States), as more and more countries withdraw their recognition of Taipei in favor of Beijing. Thailand’s following Beijing’s line on the Taiwan question will further isolate Taipei.
China has also provided support for the Bangkok government’s crackdown on domestic dissent. Overlooked by protests elsewhere such as in Hong Kong, Thailand has been rocked by pro-democracy street demonstrations over the past year. Thailand is nominally a constitutional monarchy, but since 2014, power has been concentrated in the hands of the military, which launched a coup that year. Prime Minister Chan-o-Cha is a career general who was installed in that office by the army, and he has shown no indication of relinquishing power.
In order to take a harder line against this protest movement, the Thai government has raised old fears of a communist insurgency, harkening back to the country’s decades of civil war. In October, one of the country’s foremost generals blamed the unrest on “communist elements,” which supposedly have infiltrated and control protest movements. Despite nominally being a Communist state itself, China has rhetorically backed the government’s stance. Ironically, by doing this China has taken the position of the USSR during the Cold War towards Thailand. During that time the Soviets prioritized realpolitik over world revolution, siding with the monarchy against the Communist insurgents to maintain diplomatic ties with Thailand. Now China, which in the Mao era was the insurgents’ main backer, follows that same line in its support of Bangkok.
China condemned opposition leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, a leading figure in the pro-democracy movement, issuing statements implying that Thanathorn has used his personal wealth to fund protest movements in Hong Kong. The united front presented by Beijing and Bangkok on this issue bodes nothing good for the protest movements in either country.
In both the cases of Thailand, Turkey and other countries in the world, the U.S. finds itself in a bind. When it is on paper still allied to these countries, taking punitive action against them is paradoxically more difficult, as these countries can become de facto closer to America’s geopolitical opponents, while using what formal ties with America remain as leverage to prevent further retaliation.
The root of these countries’ issues drifting away from the U.S. orbit and towards its illiberal rival powers such as Russia and China is that these countries can get material benefits from those countries without the strings attached of moral condemnation from the United States when they take actions that the American government and public find objectionable. We see this with Turkey’s treatments of the Kurds both in Turkey than in Syria, as well as with Thailand’s treatment of pro-democracy protesters.
However, in the history of its dealings with both Turkey and Thailand, the U.S. has itself supported these countries in crackdowns of their owns on domestic dissent. The U.S. supported numerous Turkish military coups as well as the Thai government’s war on its Communist insurgency. This history gives its condemnation of those countries’ actions today a lack of credibility with those countries’ publics (especially in the case of Turkey). The end result is that, by seeking to deny governments of these countries legitimacy, they give them more legitimacy with at least some of their own people than they might otherwise have.
Eschewing the revolutionary rhetoric of the Soviet Union and Maoist China (even if in both cases it was not always lived up to), China and Russia today take a line that they will deal with anyone and not interfere in countries’ internal affairs (which they also do not always live up to). Countries can get the same pragmatic benefits from them that they might from the U.S., but without inconvenient moral condemnation.
During the Cold War, it was possible for the United States to perform pragmatic actions like these while simultaneously being able to serve as a voice for pro-democratic movements around the world, most crucially behind the Iron Curtain. That approach may no longer be possible. The U.S. has yet to fully adapt to this new reality, but it may have too very soon, before it is too late.
